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In preparation for the 8th Review Conference, a meeting 
comprising 72 delegates from 30 countries was convened in 
Warsaw in September 2015 to identify and discuss trends in 
science and technology relevant to the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention. The conference noted many issues 
of relevance to the Review Conference and reached several 
overarching conclusions.
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Developments in science and 
technology and the BWC
The upcoming Review Conference will consider whether there had been any novel developments 
since the Seventh Review Conference that could either enable activities inconsistent with the aims 
and objectives of the treaty, or which would not be covered by the BWC (Article I) or additional 
understandings reached at subsequent review conferences. 
No concrete examples of such developments were 
identified either through the literature reviews or in 
workshop discussions. 
However, a number of potential future scenarios were 
identified that do give cause for concern. Situations 
where, for example, the mechanisms of action of 
weapons are not clearly ‘chemical’ or ‘biological’, where 
components are significantly different from existing 
biological systems, or where inorganic materials mimic 
biological function, thereby having a biological effect. 
It was easy to envisage how progress in areas such as 
the convergence of the sciences, nanotechnology and 
therapeutic design, might lead to such consequences. 
States Parties could proactively consider the implications 
of these scenarios before they can be realised, 
thereby providing a window of opportunity to develop 
appropriate responses and actions. 
Given the increasing pace of progress and the 
additional possibility of sudden ‘non-linear’ advances 
in research fields, it is difficult to estimate when such 
potential scenarios might become relevant to the BWC. 
Further consideration of progress in this area may be 
needed prior to the 9th Review Conference and this 
reinforces the importance of a flexible process for on-
going reviews (see page 7). 
 
Biotechnology is an increasingly important global 
manufacturing technology. Degrading manufacturing 
infrastructure and capability has long been a tool of 
war, insurgency and armed conflict. The ‘bio-economy’ 
itself is therefore a potential target for biological 
weapons. The BWC currently prohibits weapons that 
cause harm to human, animals and plants and it should 
be explored whether there are any riskes, not already 
captured by existing treaties and laws, of weapons 
that cause damage to equipment, supplies, or material 
associated with the bio-economy.
The conference also noted an increased need for 
education and outreach to promote the aims and 
objectives of the BWC amongst the scientific community 
as well as the provision of responsible mentorship 
for early-stage researchers. There are already some 
examples of excellence in this area (see Box 1) but more 
effort is needed by States Parties and ‘best practices’ 
disseminated.
Box 1: An example of excellence in socially responsible scientific mentorship (Synbio LEAP) 
The Leadership Excellence Accelerator Program 
(LEAP) provides Fellows with mentorship, practical 
skills and a sustaining network to help them guide  
a socially responsible future for synthetic biology. 
It is an incubator for emerging leaders across 
disciplines and sectors to develop new strategies  
for biotechnology in the public interest. 
LEAP is an intensive year-long non-residential 
Fellowship program. Each round, twenty fellows 
participate in two in-residence workshops during 
which Fellows work together to develop strategies 
to address their top challenges for the practice of 
synthetic biology, under the guidance of world-class 
experts across disciplines and sectors.
Image 
Participants at a LEAP meeting at the Wilson Center, Washington DC. 
Photo courtesy of David Sun Kong Photography.
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Monitoring developments in 
science and technology 
It is clearly desirable for the BWC to ensure that new knowledge and techniques do not  
facilitate breaches of the treaty, whilst expediting their peaceful applications. This requires  
an understanding of how developments in the life sciences and biotechnology might  
impact the treaty. 
There is therefore a pressing need for effective,  
on-going, and suitably resourced arrangements to:
•	 Formulate specific questions that can be answered 
by reviewing developments in science and 
technology; 
•	 Identify current scientific and technical capabilities 
pertinent to these questions; 
•	 Consider the implications of those development in 
the context of the BWC; and 
•	 Take decisions or actions necessitated by those 
developments. 
Models used by other international bodies, including 
disarmament forums, environmental or health treaties 
could be adapted for this purpose. The advantages 
and disadvantages of these different formats should be 
explored in the context of the BWC’s remit.
Whatever processes is eventually implemented, it 
should be:
•	 Flexible – able to adjust to changing needs and 
priorities;
•	 Inclusive – able to take advantage of expertise, 
wherever it is to be found;
•	 Agile – able to adjust quickly to seize all available 
opportunities;
•	 Responsive – able to actually change when needed; 
•	 Able to foster greater engagement – actively 
encouraging and enabling contributions from the 
widest possible set of stakeholders; and 
•	 Transparent – ensuring the widest possible group  
of stakeholders benefit from its work.
The conference observed that the development of a 
technique for systematically assessing the risk of new 
scientific developments would be of enormous help in 
assessing the threat of future trends. Such a process 
might also usefully consider criteria for identifying 
relevant or significant developments.
The global ability to deal with disease 
has been enhanced
The meeting noted that our collective capacity to deal with disease has markedly improved 
since the Seventh Review Conference, regardless of whether the outbreak is naturally occurring 
or the result of a malevolent act. Several factors have contributed to this.
Understanding disease
Improved understanding of disease mechanisms 
has increased our capacity to detect, respond to 
and mitigate outbreaks, regardless of their source. 
Such developments strengthen capacities relevant to 
Articles VII and X of the BWC. Particularly noteworthy 
is our enhanced understanding of transmissibility 
and host range; pathogenicity and virulence; toxins; 
unusual disease agents (including prions and fungi); 
immunology and host-pathogen interactions; the role 
of the microbiome; and the significance of ‘biofilms’ for 
pathogen persistence. 
Detection of disease
Developments in technology have enabled faster, 
more accurate detection and characterisation of 
disease outbreaks facilitating more rapid and effective 
intervention. These will reduce the impact of an 
outbreak, regardless of its origin, thus supporting the 
aims of Articles VII and X of the BWC. In particular, the 
meeting identified advances in biosensors, biomarkers, 
mass spectrometry, microscopy and imaging as 
significant in this respect. More comprehensive baseline 
data is needed to assist in comparisons and establish a 
‘norm’ against which to compare unusual events.
We are increasingly able to differentiate between 
deliberate and natural outbreaks, using genomics, PCR 
and mass spectrometry and the emerging discipline 
of ‘microbial forensics’ can help establish attribution if 
a malevolent deployment is suspected. Such a finding 
would entail obligations and commitments by other 
States Parties under Article VII, as well as additional 
agreements reached at successive review conferences. 
Diagnosis and surveillance
Improvements in diagnostics and disease surveillance 
can identify causative agents more rapidly, expediting 
the selection of optimal treatment options and preventing 
transmission. These developments strengthen capacities 
applicable to Articles VII and X of the BWC. Relevant 
improvements here include; rapid diagnosis of unknown 
pathogens; sequencing; PCR diagnostics; distributed 
diagnostics (see Box 2) and point-of-care devices; 
centralisation of certain types of laboratory capacity; 
genetic and molecular epidemiology; as well as the 
use of cheap and disposable equipment. Substantial 
improvements in diagnostic speed and accuracy  
were noted.
Box 2: Distributed diagnostics 
Developments in genetic 
sequencing technologies 
have not only made 
it faster and easier to 
sequence a genome but 
have made it possible to 
do it around the world. 
The MinION nanopore sequencer was deployed 
by the European Mobile Laboratories in Guinea in 
2015, as part of an effort to address a large scale 
Ebola Virus Disease outbreak. This new platform 
enabled Guinean authorities to obtain important 
diagnostic and epidemiological information within  
48 hours with the samples never leaving the country.
Image 
Left: Josh Quick, University of Birmingham, UK. Center: Dr. N’Faly 
Magassouba, Infectious and Tropical Diseases Department, 
National Hospital Donka, Conakry, Guinea. Right: Prof. Miles 
Carrol, Public Health England, Porton Downs UK.
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Preventing, mitigating and treating disease 
using vaccines and drugs 
The timely use of effective vaccines and therapeutics 
prevents or reduces the impact of outbreaks, 
regardless of cause. This is of direct relevance to 
Articles VII and X. Rapid detection and characterization 
of infectious agents reduces the time required to 
develop vaccines, drugs and other counter-measures. 
Outsourcing of key production steps has reduced the 
need for dedicated vaccine production infrastructure. 
It is increasingly simpler, faster and cheaper to 
industrialize production processes. Single-use 
equipment and modular production technologies 
shorten turn-around times. A more distributed 
production base in industry reduces the distance a 
product has to travel to its point of use. However, 
regulatory and liability issues associated with 
diagnostics, drugs and vaccines in health emergencies 
continue to limit potential for progress and this is an 
issue that should be addressed.
High-throughput platforms and ‘big-data’ approaches 
continue to reveal a wealth of potential new targets 
and candidates for drugs and vaccines. The design, 
testing and optimisation processes have been 
streamlined by the ‘digitalization’ of biology supported 
by better computational technologies, improved 
capacity for rational design, integration of synthetic 
biology approaches, more sophisticated modelling 
tools, enhanced synthesis technologies and a wider 
array of platform technologies (see Box 3). 
Online laboratories and facilities now offer all of 
these services at a single site, as an ‘organism design 
support service’. Throughput has been improved 
using machine-learning and semantic web-based 
approaches. Enhanced screening of drug candidates 
and other enabling tools have helped streamline 
the development pipeline. However, bioinformatics 
capabilities remain a major challenge in this area.
Since the Seventh Review Conference, a number of 
new drug classes have been developed and existing 
classes of drugs have been further exploited. Examples 
include: antibody-based drugs; novel drugs for diseases 
traditionally associated with biological weapons (e.g. 
anthrax, ricin); the use of drug combinations; drugs to 
target disease vectors; and in identifying useful off-label 
indications for existing drugs.
Vaccines have been developed for combating multiple 
agents or strains by targeting conserved regions 
and rendered more effective and stable through the 
use of virus-like particles and improved adjuvants. 
A number of new avenues for designing vaccines 
have been explored, utilising synthetic biology, DNA 
nanostructures and RNA viruses. 
Box 3: An example of how the digitization of biology accelerates vaccine development.  
The Novartis H7N9 influenza vaccine response – Combining synthetic virus generation  
with flu cell culture platform 
Synthetic virus rescue in collaboration 
with Synthetic Genomics Vaccines Inc.




Monday 8 April 
Sequence confirmation of vaccine  
virus rescue
Tuesday 2 April 
Venter sythesizes HA & NA genes
Wednesday 3 April 
Sythesized genes received in Cambridge. 
1st transfection
Thursday 4 April 
Sythesized genes provided by NVD & 
Venter received at US CDC
Saturday 6 April 
1st evidence of rescue of vaccine virus
Thursday 11 April 
US CDC receives wild type virus from China
Friday 12 April 
Virus shipped to Uni MBG
Friday 19 April 
Virus released from customs to Uni MBG
Thursday 2 May 
1st round of limiting dilution subcloning 
completed
Monday 13 May 
2nd round of limiting dilution subcloning 
completed
Tuesday 14 May 
German autorities notify NVD that  
RG-ID-1603 can be manufactured at BSL2
Wednesday 15 May 
Sequence of HA & NA genes after 
subcloning confirmed
Thursday 16 May 
Virus PCR – for bovine, porcine 
adventitious agents, shipped to NDV  
MBG GMP seed lab
Friday 17 May 
Passing of virus in the seed lab begins
Monday 27 May 
Start of QC testing on seed lot
Friday 24 May 
Second Round of Passing in seed lab 
complete, start of seed lot manufacturing
FINISH
2013
Thursday 13 June 
2500L fermenter inoculated to start 
production of Ph I CTM
START Sunday 31 March 
China CDC reports human infections w/ H7N9 
influenza, post sequences on GISAID
May
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Industrialisation of biotechnology
The space and resources required for biologics 
production has also decreased and the physical size 
of production equipment has been drastically reduced. 
Smaller facilities using more compact equipment 
increases the range of potential sites and reduces 
logistical challenges, in some cases also offering cost 
benefits. Scaling-up production to industrial levels has 
been simplified and can be accomplished more quickly, 
although it can still take years. 
In some cases, the costs of industrial scale-up have 
fallen, through improved ‘directed evolution’ techniques 
for example. In other cases, improvements in efficacy 
and efficiency, such as those associated with automation 
and miniaturization, may incur increased costs. 
Bio-based production and biosynthesis have 
become common methodologies, aided by particular 
developments in the use of bacterial and yeast 
‘chassis’ and ‘scaffolds’ to control the spatio-temporal 
arrangement of components. There have been 
improvements in vaccine expression, in particular 
through insect cell line and suspended cell cultures 
and the use of bulk production material. 
The increase in usage of disposable or single-use 
equipment has also been noteworthy. The range 
of processes for which disposable equipment is 
available has increased in number and complexity and 
increasing standardization of parts, facilitates switching 
to disposable equipment. Disposable or single-use 
equipment reduces the upfront capital investment 
required as systems for cleaning and sterilization are 
not required. They also reduce the chance of cross-
contamination, making the systems more efficient. 
Outsourcing of production, including the advent of 
‘biofabs’, has also become a reality since the Seventh 
Review Conference. Post-production purification steps 
have been improved or simplified, as a result of the 
growing regulatory attention paid to ensuring viral 
removal or inactivation. 
Delivery of drugs
Significant hurdles to storing or shipping labile 
therapeutics have been overcome. There have  
been notable successes in replacing cold chains  
and increasing the environmental stability of vaccines  
and drugs, in some cases enabling room temperature 
storage. 
Automated design strategies and other tools have 
made it easier to engineer and tailor drug delivery 
systems. The range of drug delivery platforms, such as 
enhanced and novel viral vectors and ‘microneedles’ 
has increased. Trans-dermal delivery systems are 
more effective and the range of substances that can 
be successfully delivered this way has increased 
since the Seventh Review Conference, opening 
opportunities for the non-invasive use a wider 
range of drugs and vaccines. There have also been 
improvements in targeted delivery systems, ensuring 
enhanced drug or vaccine access to the desired sites, 
tissues or cell-types following administration.
Elucidation of nanoparticle structure-function 
relationships has led to improved drug delivery 
vehicles. The range of nanoparticle-based drug 
delivery platforms has increased and now includes 
formulations that cross barriers and penetrate previously 
unreachable sites. Nanoparticles can now be designed 
to enhance the activity of their payload or to overcome 
its rapid metabolism. This reduces costs and increases 
efficiency by reducing the amount of payload needed, 
reducing threshold activity requirements for effective 
payloads, or prolonging their action be extending 
their effective life time. Controlled release of payloads, 
for example by remote activation or environmental 
response, reduces side effects.
Antimicrobial resistance
The conference noted, however, that past advances in 
treating disease are being reversed by the increasing 
antimicrobial resistance. For example, antiviral resistance 
and resistance to anti-malarial therapies have been 
growing in both numbers and geographic distribution.
Although the problem remains severe, we now have 
a better understanding of the mechanisms involved, 
including the identification and characterization of 
genetic components, structure-function relationships, 
metabolic processes, and community responses. 
Some new drugs have been developed, including 
additional antimicrobials (comprising both antibiotics and 
antivirals), therapies to re-sensitize microbes to existing 
antimicrobials, and drugs to target persistent organisms 
in biofilms or resistant cells. 
Responding to, rolling back, and 
recovering from disease
The conference noted that the speed at which an outbreak can be terminated and normal life 
resumed, determines the overall impact of a disease event. These are important considerations  
for both Articles VII and X of the BWC. 
Given the advances listed above, the meeting noted 
that, provided the remaining logistical, economic and 
technical challenges can be surmounted, it should now 
be possible to assemble patchwork capabilities into 
a diffuse but integrated system for countering global 
or local outbreaks. Obviously this highly desirable 
objective would only be successful if backed by 
political will and the fostering of international support 
and collaboration.
Such a system could scale from local needs through 
to international responses. A structure that enabled 
data, such as pathogen sequences, to be shared 
more effectively and efficiently would facilitate a rapid 
an effective response. As expertise and ‘know-how’ 
matures, opportunities for technological leapfrogging 
appear, as was the case with mobile communication 
systems. Developing countries can then access 
opportunities and capabilities in the field that match, if 
not surpass, those found in developed countries.
A co-ordinated response to a disease outbreak can only 
be effective if the communities involved are prepared to 
work with the emergency responders. Anthropological 
studies have identified and developed ‘good practice’ 
guidelines for obtaining community cooperation. 
Equally, improved access to drugs and vaccines has 
enhanced infection control, using, for example, pre-
emptive vaccination whilst a more judicious choice of 
infection control approaches (such as quarantine and 
travel restrictions) can be matched appropriately to 
specific situations. ‘Microbial forensics’ can be used  
to help establish attribution if a malevolent 
deployment is suspected.
New tools have improved the medical management 
of disease outbreaks, including intentional releases. 
Context-specific guidance to optimise response 
preparedness, for example for the use of anti-microbial 
drugs and decontamination options is now available. 
Superior protective equipment is now available, 
reducing the burden placed on responders and allowing 
them to work for longer, increasing the efficiency of a 
response. A wider range of decontaminants, and the 
optimisation of approaches for developing and using 
them, have reduced environmental transmission risks 
and released contaminated sites more quickly.
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Advances that reduce risks relevant 
to the BWC
The conference welcomed a number of developments that reduce overall risks relevant  
to the BWC. These include:
•	 Enhanced ability to identify prohibited activities,  
relevant to Article I; 
•	 More effective barriers to acquiring biological agents 
for activities prohibited by the BWC in a manner that  
does not restrict their use for permitted purposes,  
relevant to Articles III, IV and X; 
•	 Alternatives to capabilities which might be used for 
prohibited activities without impacting function for 
permitted purposes, relevant to Articles III and X; 
•	 Alternatives to agents which might be used for  
prohibited activities without impacting their use for 
permitted purposes, relevant to Articles III and X; and 
•	 Progress in for identifying activities with potential 
biosecurity concerns, relevant to Articles III and IV.
Developments in science and technology 
posing future risks for the BWC
The scientific advances described in this report could also facilitate almost every step of a 
biological weapons programme and technological barriers to acquiring and using a biological 
weapon have been conspicuously eroded since the Seventh Review Conference. This has 
significant implications for Articles I, III and IV of the BWC.
Many of these developments are at the leading 
edge of current capabilities. They are expensive and 
complicated to acquire and deploy successfully. Making 
use of them for prohibited purposes would probably 
require the resources of a state. This situation may 
change in the future, reinforcing the need for on-going 
efforts to review relevant developments in science and 
technology.Examples of these developments include:
Acquisition of pathogens or toxins
Since the Seventh Review Conference there has  
been headway in: 
•	 Acquiring agents from nature; including an 
expanded range of possible agents and locations 
in which they are to be found, as well as tools for 
characterising previously ‘unculturable’ microbes; 
•	 Synthesising existing agents; non-specialists can 
now compile gene ‘cassettes’ coding for virulence 
factors and ‘reboot’ some viruses; pathogens 
responsible for historical epidemics can now be 
synthesised or reactivated; many small peptides, 
bioregulators and toxins can now be produced by 
chemical synthesis;
•	 Designing and synthesising novel agents, 
using genome engineering platforms, ‘cloud-
labs’, ‘biofabs’, and more sophisticated tools, the 
availability of standards for designing, manipulating 
and compiling microbes, their parts, and proteins. 
Novel pathogens have now been produced. 
Neurobiology has also seen an exponential increase 
of output, improving our understanding of neural 
network responses associated with behaviours, such 
as anger and aggression, and physiological conditions 
such as addiction, fear and narcolepsy. Neural 
networks can now be manipulated to induce some of 
these states and work has begun to translate these 
findings to non-human primate models. 
The meeting highlighted the potential to develop 
other novel agents, including those produced using 
CRISPR/CAS9-mediated ‘gene drives’, ‘gene silencing’ 
technologies, proteins, or nanoparticles. Some of these 
types of constructs have already been inserted into 
vectors and demonstrated to produce effects in a host 
when administered by inhalation. The potential to target 
the microbiome to cause or exacerbate a disease state 
was also noted.
Enhancing virulence of naturally occurring 
pathogens
Virulence and other biological features of pathogens 
are now more easily optimised for use in biological 
weapons and some ‘enhanced pathogens’ have 
been produced. This has been made possible by 
improvements in:
•	 Identification and characterization of the genetic 
components and key structural elements controlling 
pathogenicity, transmissibility, host range, 
antimicrobial defences, drug resistance as well as  
in the mechanisms through which pathogens avoid  
the host’s immune system; 
•	 Applying an improved understanding of 
immunopathology to module the immune responses 
in a host;
•	 Using coatings and shells to confer environmental 
stability; and
•	 Developing tools for identifying and integrating 
desirable factors into biological agents. 
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Modern genome ‘editing’ technologies, such as 
CRISPR/CAS-9 often do not leave ‘fingerprints’ 
indicating that that organisms has been altered. 
This conceals attempts to enhance the organism’s 
effectiveness, hampers forensic investigations and 
complicates the differentiation between unusual and 
unnatural disease events. Some methodologies do 
leave ‘fingerprints’, in particular, the use of a gene 
drive as the ability to be passed on to the next 
generation is due to a permanent change to the 
organism. (see Box 4).
Toxins
The genetic components and mechanisms of action 
of toxins are increasingly well characterised. More 
sophisticated tools for researching and manipulating 
toxins have been developed. Biosynthesis metabolic 
pathways can now be engineered providing alternative 
production routes for toxins. This could be particularly 
important in the case of those toxins that are awkward 
to extract in large quantities from natural sources. 
Shortcomings in the quality assurance of current 
detection capacities have revealed vulnerability in our 
ability to deter or mitigate the use of toxins as weapons. 
Novel agents, or those with altered or enhanced 
characteristics have been identified or produced since 
the Seventh Review Conference.
Producing and stockpiling biological agents
Since the Seventh Review Conference, there has  
been notable progress or changes in:
•	 Concealing prohibited activities. Changes to 
production signatures and a shift towards the use 
of multiple smaller reactors compromises efforts to 
identify sites of biological weapons production; 
•	 Industrialising biological production processes. 
Less space and time are now required for scale up, 
narrowing windows for interdiction. The process can 
also be simplified using new technologies, though at 
significant cost;
•	 Producing biological agents. The increased use of 
biosynthesis and bio-based production, scaffolds, 
and ‘biopharming’ accelerates the speed and yield. 
This also applies to vaccine production;
•	 Switching production from permitted to prohibited 
activities. The use of single-use, disposable and 
modular production equipment offers possibilities 
for faster technological breakout;
•	 Acquiring relevant equipment. Critical laboratory 
materials such as reaction vessels (including those 
currently covered by control lists) can now be 
fabricated using 3-D printing technology, reducing 
the costs and potentially lowering barriers to 
prohibited activities. Once again, this complicates 
efforts to enforce non-proliferation measures.
Box 4: An example of a novel  
biological agent to target plant  
and animal populations 
The development of CRISPR-based ‘gene drives’ 
could enable individual laboratories to unilaterally 
alter the traits of wild populations and ecosystems 
without regard for national borders. Hundreds 
if not thousands of laboratories will have this 
capability within a few years. In principle, alterations 
can be undone by subsequent gene drive 
countermeasures, but must first be detected by 
environmental monitoring of at-risk species. This 
clearly requires detailed knowledge of whether 
those species can be affected. 
There are currently only a handful of laboratories 
working in the CRISPR-gene drive field.
Representatives of these groups as well as those in 
related areas have already called for transparency 
and safeguards to prevent accidental releases. 
Researchers in the field are now calling for all 
CRISPR gene drive research to publicly disclose 
experimental designs and safeguards against 
accidental release in advance of experiments. 
Transparency will ensure compliance with the BWC, 
accelerate the science by encouraging international 
collaborations, and promote early deliberations 
and community guidance of potential applications 
in public health, sustainable agriculture, and 
ecological conservation.
•	 Distributed production. The decoupling of design 
and manufacture has led to the growth of stand-
alone fabrication and production facilities. Whilst 
limited in number of geographic distribution at the 
moment at the moment, the potential for the growth 
of such facilities and their impact in changing the 
footprint of prohibited activities might warrant 
closer attention over the coming years; 
•	 Outsourcing biological production. Multipurpose 
biological production facilities suitable for varying-
scale production of biological agents as well as for 
the synthesis of genetic material and other synthetic 
genomics techniques are now commonplace. The 
existence of many ‘virtual’ biotech companies 
demonstrates the potential in this space;
•	 Storing biological agents. Increasing the 
environmental stability of biologics, together with the 
use of other approaches removes the requirements 
for cold-chain storage and its associated;
•	 Infrastructure. Improvements in production 
techniques have reduced the need for ‘stockpiling’ 
whilst the proliferation of freeze-drying capabilities 
enables this should it prove desirable.
Dispersal and delivery of biological agents
Advances in several key areas now simplify the 
delivery a biological weapon:
•	 Nanotechnology. A wider range of nanoparticles, of 
different sizes, can more efficiently deliver complex 
payloads to diverse targets. Nanoparticles can now 
target previously inaccessible physiological sites and 
cell types (e.g. by crossing the blood-brain barrier). 
Nanoparticles also add other desirable characteristics 
to agents, such as increased persistence in the body 
and immune avoidance. Nanoparticles suitable for 
aerosol release have been developed since the 
Seventh Review Conference;
•	 Aerobiology. Offers powerful tools for modelling the 
release of bioweapons, including both environmental 
and indoor dispersal patterns, helping optimise the 
release of an agent. There have also been advances 
in equipment for generating and modelling aerosol 
dispersion have also been developed;
•	 Use of chemical co-factors to increase the uptake 
of biological agents. These have been identified for 
use with biologically active proteins; and 
•	 Increasing capacity to deliver biological weapons 
via the alimentary route. The use of sophisticated 
formulations can improve absorption from the 
gastro-intestinal tract.
Increasing risks
The conference identified a number of number of other 
key developments relevant to risk assessment relevant 
to the BWC, including: 
•	 Novel acquisition strategies. The use of the ‘dark 
web’, biotechnology e-commerce or fabrication 
of biological agents from non-controlled parts, 
complicates non-proliferation obligations under 
Articles III and IV; 
•	 Modification of pathogens or toxins. This may 
confound identification and therapeutic intervention, 
thwarting efforts under Articles I, VII and X; 
•	 The digitization of biology. Publicly available data 
sets can be utilised to determine the feasibility 
of synthesising, thereby enabling a facile ‘proof 
of principle’, again complicating non-proliferation 
obligations under Article III; and
•	 Genome ‘editing’. This can be used to modulate 
drug susceptibility in disease vectors, complicating 
efforts under Articles I, VII and X.
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Further information
The information in this document is based on a Technical Report 
that includes fuller descriptions of the science and technology 
advances, an annotated bibliography and links to the research 
papers. The Technical Report can be accessed here: 
iapbwg.pan.pl
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